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On April 5, 2016 32-year-old Royal 
Canadian Mounter Police Constable 
Sarah Beckett was killed when her 
patrol car was struck  by a pickup truck 
in Langford, British Columbia.
She was on patrol at approximately 3:30 
am when the collision occurred.
The driver of the pickup truck was taken 
into custody following the collision.
Constable Beckett had 
served with the Royal 
Canadian Mounted 
Police for 11 years. 
She is survived by 
her husband and two 
children.
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IN MEMORIAM
Source: Officer Down Memorial Page available at www.odmp.org/canada
“She was a great 
police officer, truly 
dedicated to 
serving others.”
RCMP Assistant Commissioner
Sharon Woodburn
“They are our heroes. We shall not forget them.” 
inscription, Canadian Police And Peace Officer's Memorial
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officers across British Columbia.”
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Highlights In This Issue
What’s New For Police In The Library 3
Implied Licence Doctrine Depends On Officer’s 
Purpose
4
Helping Purchaser Does Not Necessarily Mean 
Aiding Seller
6
Antique Firearm’ Not Only Determined By Age 7
Inventory Search Not Justified: Marihuana Excluded 9
Passenger In Stopped Vehicle Not Necessarily 
Detained
11
Entrapment Application Rejected: Police Acted On 
Reasonable Suspicion
14
Asking If Someone Can Hook A Person Up With 
Drugs Is Not, By Itself, Entrapment
18
Policing Across Canada: Facts & Figures 20
Unless otherwise noted all articles are authored by 
Mike  Novakowski, MA, LLM. The articles contained 
herein are provided for information purposes only 
and are not to be construed as legal or other 
professional advice. The opinions expressed herein 
are not necessarily  the opinions of the Justice 
Institute of British Columbia. “In Service: 10-8” 
welcomes your comments or contributions to this 
newsletter.   
Upcoming Courses
Advanced	 Police	 Training
Advanced training  provides opportunities for skill 
development and career enhancement for police 
officers. Training  is offered in the areas of 
investigation, patrol operations and leadership for 
in-service municipal and RCMP police officers.
JIBC	 Police	 Academy
See Course List here.
Graduate Certificates
Intelligence Analysis
or 
Tactical Criminal Analysis
www.jibc.ca
NEW JIBC Graduate 
Certificate in Public 
Safety Leadership
2016 
BC LAW ENFORCEMENT 
MEMORIAL
This year’s Memorial Service will be hosted by 
the Vancouver Police Department and Delta 
Police Department.
Date & Time:
Sunday, September 25, 2016 at 1:00 PM
Location:
Brockton Oval in Stanley Park, Vancouver, BC
see 
pages  
23-24
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WHAT’S	 NEW	 FOR	 POLICE	 IN	 
THE	 LIBRARY
The Justice Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of its 
recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
50 top tools for coaching: a complete toolkit for 
developing and empowering people.
Gillian Jones and Ro Gorell.
London; Philadelphia, PA: Kogan Page, 2015.
HD 30.4 J656 2015
101 great answers to the toughest interview 
questions.
Ron Fry.
Wayne, NJ: Career Press, Inc., 2016.
HF 5549.5 I6 F75 2016
101 smart questions to ask on your interview.
Ron Fry.
Wayne, NJ: Career Press, Inc., 2016.
HF 5549.5 I6 F757 2016
Becoming a master student.
Dave Ellis, Doug Toft, contributing editor,
Debra Dawson (Western University)
Toronto, ON: Nelson Education, 2016.
LB 2343.3 E44 2016
Behavioral  guide to personality disorders 
(DSM-5).
Douglas H. Ruben, PH. D.
Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas Publisher, LTD., 
2015.
RC 554 R83 2015
Canadian family law.
Julien D. Payne and Marilyn A. Payne.
Toronto, ON: Irwin Law, 2015.
KE 539 P295 2015
Change management: a guide to effective 
implementation.
Los Angeles, CA: SAGE, 2016.
HD 58.8 M33 2016
Children's law handbook.
Marvin A. Zuker and Lynn M. Kirwin.
Toronto, ON: Carswell, 2015.
KE 512 Z85 2015
Design as scholarship: case studies from the 
learning sciences.
Edited by Vanessa Svihla and Richard Reeve.
New York, NY: Routledge, 2016.
LB 1060 D39 2016
Design for how people learn.
Julie Dirksen.
San Francisco, CA: New Riders, 2016.
LB 1060 D57 2016
Engaging minds:  cultures of education and 
practices of teaching.
Brent Davis, Dennis Sumara, and Rebecca Luce-
Kapler.
New York, NY: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 
2015.
LB 1060 D38 2015
Generation me: why today's young Americans are 
more confident, assertive, entitled--and more 
miserable than ever before.
Jean M. Twenge, Ph. D.
New York, NY: Atria Paperback, 2014.
HQ 799.7 T94 2014
Mindful  management:  the neuroscience of trust 
and effective workplace leadership.
Dalton A. Kehoe.
Richmond Hill, ON: Communicate for Life, Ltd., 
2015.
HD 57.7 K44 2015
The student's survival guide to research.
Monty L. McAdoo.
Chicago, IL: Neal-Schuman, 2015.
ZA 3075 M43 2015
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IMPLIED	 LICENCE	 APPLICATION	 
DEPENDS	 ON	 OFFICER’S	 PURPOSE
R. v. Parr, 2016 BCCA 99
The accused was arrested at the 
roadside under BC’s Mental Health 
Act. He was transported to a hospital 
for medical care, his vehicle was 
impounded and police took charge of 
his dog. The investigator contacted another 
detachment, some 3 1/2 hours away, and asked that 
another police officer assist by attending  the 
accused’s property in an effort to locate his fiance, 
advise her of the situation, and see if arrangements 
could be made to pick up  the dog. The assisting 
officer knew the accused was also the  subject of an 
ongoing  marihuana grow-op investigation. The 
assisting  officer attended the accused’s residence at 
2:52 am. He found no vehicles present but the lights 
to the main building  and a secondary residence 
were illuminated. 
The officer walked straight to the front door of the 
house and knocked. A sign on the front door read, 
“Please use the side door.” The officer heard a 
television or radio on inside the house and could 
smell vegetative marihuana. Since no one answered 
the front door, the  officer walked to the side door 
and knocked loudly. Again, he  could smell 
vegetative marihuana. A PVC pipe was noted at the 
side of the house that appeared to be venting  air 
from the basement. With no answer at the side door, 
the officer went to the secondary residence and 
noted plastic sheeting  and blinds covering  some of 
its windows. This residence did not appear to be 
occupied and there was no answer to the officer’s 
knocking  on a sliding  door. He did not do a 
perimeter search of the property. The officer then left 
the property and stopped on the highway to see if he 
could smell marihuana upwind from the property, 
but he could not. 
This olfactory information obtained from the entry 
onto the accused’s property  was used in conjunction 
with the pre-existing  grow-op  investigation, and a 
search warrant was obtained and executed. A large 
marihuana grow operation was located on the 
property along  with some guns. The accused was 
charged with drug and weapon offences.  
BC Supreme Court
The officer testified to the following:
• He attended the accused’s property to locate the 
fiancée, notify her that the accused was on his 
way to the hospital and see if someone could 
take custody of the dog.
• He was aware that a drug  investigation was 
ongoing  and that he might make observations 
confirming  or dispelling  suspicions that the 
accused’s residence housed a marihuana grow-
op.
• He had no grounds to be on the property to 
investigate a potential marihuana grow-op  and 
went straight to the doors to determine if anyone 
was home. 
• He immediately  left the property when no one 
answered.
• He would not have gone to the residence had 
he not received the request for assistance.
• He did not place a  phone call to handle  the 
request because “bad medical news about 
somebody” was best delivered in person and an 
unanswered phone call would not confirm that 
no one was home.
• He denied the suggestion that his motivation for 
attending  the property was, at least in part, to 
further an ongoing criminal investigation. 
The judge concluded that the officer was entitled to 
enter onto the property under the implied licence to 
knock doctrine. The purpose of the entry was to 
communicate  with an occupant by notifying  next of 
kin of a  medical emergency. The entry was not to 
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gather evidence in furtherance of the drug 
investigation. The officer’s knowledge of the ongoing 
drug  investigation did not undermine his otherwise 
valid purpose of communicating  with an occupant 
about the accused’s emergency  medical condition. 
Thus, the  officer’s observations properly formed part 
of the reasonable grounds for the search warrant. 
The accused was convicted of producing  marihuana, 
possession for the purpose of trafficking  and 
improperly storing firearms. 
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused appealed his 
conviction arguing  the trial 
judge erred in the application 
of the implied licence  doctrine. 
In the accused’s view, the officer was motivated, at 
least in part, by an investigative purpose when he 
entered onto the property and smelled the 
marihuana. This, he asserted, undermined the 
implied licence doctrine.
Implied Licence (Invitation) to Knock
Under the  common law, the “occupants of a home 
are deemed to have waived their reasonable 
expectation of privacy for defined purposes’” said 
the Court of Appeal. It continued:
Where the police knock for the sole purpose of 
facilitating communication with an occupant, 
they act within the scope of the implied 
invi tat ion. In these circumstances, no 
constitutionally recognized search occurs 
because the entry does not intrude upon the 
occupant’s reasonable expectation of privacy. 
The waiver of privacy rights embodied in the 
implied invitation extends no further than is 
required to achieve this purpose. Where the 
conduct of the police goes beyond that which is 
permitted by the implied licence to knock, the 
conditions of that licence are breached and the 
police approach the dwelling as an intruder. 
[para. 2]
If the approach to the home for the purpose of 
communicating  is motivated by an investigative 
purpose, such as smelling  for marihuana, the police 
conduct exceeds the scope of the implied licence to 
knock principle and the search is subject to s. 8 
Charter scrutiny.
Justice Fitch, writing  the unanimous appeal decision, 
found the trial judge did not err in concluding  that 
the officer entered onto the property for the limited 
purpose of communicating  with the occupants. His 
intention was not to further an investigative aim. He 
stated:
In my view, it is important to distinguish ... 
between the purpose for the entry and 
knowledge on the part of the police of the 
potential that evidence might be acquired in the 
course of that entry. Provided the police act for a 
purpose falling within the scope of the implied 
invitation to knock principle, and for no other 
reason, the fact they are aware evidence might 
be acquired in the course of the entry does not 
make them “intruders” acting outside the scope 
of the doctrine. I accept, however, that the 
existence of an ongoing  criminal investigation at 
the time of the entry, and advertence by the 
police to the prospect of gathering  evidence in 
the course of that entry, are relevant 
considerations to be taken into account when 
determining  the purpose for which the entry and 
knock was undertaken. [para. 55]
Justice Fitch, however, rejected the notion that a 
dual purpose in approaching  the door to knock 
could not undermine the implied licence doctrine, 
finding  such reasoning  “incompatible with the 
implied licence principle.” In other words, the 
police exceed implied licence and cannot rely on it 
where  they have both a purpose to speak to an 
occupant (even if this is the “predominant or 
“Where the police knock for the sole purpose of facilitating communication with an 
occupant, they act within the scope of the implied invitation. In these circumstances, no 
constitutionally recognized search occurs because the entry does not intrude upon the 
occupant’s reasonable expectation of privacy. The waiver of privacy rights embodied in 
the implied invitation extends no further than is required to achieve this purpose.”
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primary purpose”)  while at the same time they have 
a secondary purpose motivated by an investigative 
goal such as sniffing  for the presence of drugs. 
Rather, the communication must be the sole purpose 
for the entry as the trial judge had in fact found in 
this case. The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
HELPING	 PURCHASER	 DOES	 NOT	 
NECESSARILY	 MEAN	 AIDING	 
SELLER
R. v. Machushek, 2016 SKCA 41
Two undercover officers entered a bar 
to see if they could further an 
investigation into cocaine trafficking. 
They played pool and mingled with a 
group of people, including  the accused. 
After a few hours of drinking, the officers initiated a 
discussion with the accused about buying  cocaine. 
When the bar closed, he took the officers back to his 
home where they used the bathroom and admired 
woodworking  projects. The accused made a call to a 
drug  dealer and then all three drove in the officers’ 
truck to a darkened street to meet the seller. The 
seller sold each person a gram of cocaine. The 
accused did not handle the officers’ money or the 
cocaine intended for them, nor did he receive any 
payment from the  seller or the officers.  After the 
buy, the three  went back to the accused’s home. He 
asked the officers to come in and party but they 
declined. Several months later the accused was 
arrested and charged with two counts of trafficking 
and two counts of possessing proceeds of crime.
Saskatchewan Provincial Court
The judge found the accused did not 
commit any acts of trafficking  in his own 
right nor was he a party to the offence. 
He did not aid (s. 21(1)(b)  Criminal 
Code)  or abet (s. 21(1)(c))  the seller such that he 
would have been guilty of the seller’s act of 
trafficking. Rather, the judge held that the accused 
was “facilitating  a buy as a buyer” and that he and 
the two officers were “joint purchasers.” The accused 
was acquitted of the trafficking  charges. He was also 
acquitted of the proceeds charges because he did 
not receive any money as a result of the  transaction 
nor had he ever held any of the officers’ money. 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
The Crown appealed the 
acquittals suggesting  that the 
accused was guilty  of trafficking 
because  he aided and abetted 
the trafficker. In the Crown’s view, if the purchase 
would not have taken place without the assistance of 
the accused, he should be found guilty of aiding  and 
abetting cocaine trafficking.
Justice Jackson, however, felt this reasoning  would 
set the bar too low in determining  what constitutes 
aiding  or abetting  drug  trafficking. Not every act that 
assists a purchase of drugs can lead to a finding  of 
guilt for trafficking. Otherwise, a  friend who drives a 
buyer across town to purchase drugs would be guilty 
of trafficking. “With respect to the actus reus, where 
the facts reveal no more than incidental assistance of 
the sale through rendering  aid to the purchaser, 
the ... proper charge is not trafficking, regardless of 
intent,” said Justice Jackson. “With respect to the 
mens rea, ... the test is whether the  assistance is 
rendered solely to the  purchaser or, cast in different 
terms, but arriving  at the same result, whether the 
‘acts are designed to aid the purchaser’.” 
The Court of Appeal provided a summary to assist in 
determining  whether a person committed a 
trafficking offence:
[W]hen the charge is trafficking and the theory 
of the Crown is that the accused is guilty of 
trafficking either as a principal or as a party, the 
analytical framework to apply is as follows:
BY THE BOOK:
Parties	 to	 Offence: Criminal Code
s. 21(1) Every one is a party to an offence who
(a) actually commits it;
(b)  does or omits to do anything for the 
purpose of aiding any person to commit it; or
(c) abets any person in committing it.
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(a) has the accused committed any acts of 
trafficking in his or her own right?
(b) if no, did any acts or omissions of the 
accused aid or abet the trafficker in the 
commission of the offence of trafficking?
(c) if yes, do the facts reveal something  more 
than incidental assistance to the trafficker 
through rendering assistance to the 
purchaser?
(d) if yes, did the accused know that the 
trafficker intended to commit the offence of 
trafficking?
(e) if yes, did the accused intend to aid or abet 
the trafficker in the commission of the 
offence of trafficking? [para. 72]
Here, the trial judge did not err in finding  the 
accused’s intent was to aid himself and the police 
officers in buying  cocaine, and not to aid the seller. 
The Crown’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
‘ANTIQUE	 FIREARM’	 NOT	 ONLY	 
DETERMINED	 BY	 AGE
R. v. Kennedy, 2016 MBCA 5                   
The accused was arrested outside his 
house trailer for breaching  a court-
ordered condition that he have no 
contact with his neighbour.  He was 
pa t ted-down fo r o f f ice r sa fe ty 
incidental to arrest and two loaded handguns were 
found in his pants’ pockets. Both guns were cocked 
and ready to fire. The guns were very old but testing 
confirmed that they were functional, although one 
fired intermittently. Police obtained warrants to 
search the accused’s trailer and found eight guns, 12 
magazines and 200 rounds of ammunition including 
a Clement Arms .32 calibre British Bulldog  revolver 
with five rounds in its cylinder. The accused was 
charged with breach of recognizance and firearms 
offences. 
Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench
The accused was convicted of several 
offences but acquitted on a charge under 
s. 91(1)  of the Criminal Code  for 
possessing  a prohibited firearm without 
a registration certificate because the British Bulldog 
revolver was an antique firearm for the purpose of s. 
84(3). Section 84(3)  deems certain weapons, 
including  an antique firearm, not to be firearm for 
the purpose of s. 91(1). An antique firearm is defined 
as including  “any firearm manufactured before 1898 
that was not designed to discharge rim-fire or centre-
fire ammunition and that has not been redesigned to 
discharge such ammunition.” The judge found the 
“expert witnesses called on behalf of the Crown 
were unable to determine whether this particular 
firearm was manufactured before or after 1898.” 
Thus, the Crown failed to prove the essential 
elements under s. 91(1).  
Manitoba Court of Appeal
The Crown appealed the 
accused’s acquittal on the s. 91
(1)  charge, among  other things, 
arguing  that the trial judge 
erred in only considering  the year of manufacture. 
Rather, the Crown suggested that the definition of 
antique firearm also requires that the firearm cannot 
be designed, or re-designed, to discharge rim-fire or 
centre-fire ammunition. In this case, a  Crown expert 
testified that the British Bulldog  revolver fires centre-
fire  ammunition.  Therefore, the British Bulldog 
revolver did not fall within the definition of antique 
firearm.
The Court of Appeal overturned the acquittal and 
entered a conviction on the s. 91(1) charge.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
BY THE BOOK:
Antique	 Firearm: Criminal Code
s. 84(1) antique firearm means
(a) any firearm manufactured before 1898 that 
was not designed to discharge rim-fire or 
centre-fire ammunition and that has not been 
redesigned to discharge such ammunition, or
(b) any firearm that is prescribed to be an antique firearm;
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INVENTORY	 SEARCH	 NOT	 
JUSTIFIED:	 MARIHUANA	 
EXCLUDED
R. v. Harflett, 2016 ONCA 248
The accused was arrested for driving 
with a Quebec driver’s licence while 
his Ontario licence was suspended 
under s. 36  of Ontario’s Highway 
Traffic Act (HTA). He was patted down 
and read his rights. Since the accused could not 
drive the vehicle and it had to be  removed from the 
highway as it posed a safety concern, a tow truck 
was called. The officer decided to have  the car 
towed to a nearby hotel with the accused riding  in 
the tow truck with its driver. The  accused could then 
pay his fines the following  day, get his Ontario 
license back and resume his journey. 
While waiting  for the tow truck, the officer 
conducted an inventory search of the vehicle as he 
always did in such circumstances. When he opened 
the trunk, he smelled the odour of raw marijuana 
and found a large quantity of it. He immediately 
arrested the accused for possessing  marijuana for the 
purpose of trafficking  and re-read the right to 
counsel. The car was then towed to the police 
station and a full search was performed.
Ontario Court of Justice
The officer testified that he searches 
“every vehicle” for which he calls a tow 
truck.  He will first check for exterior 
damage and then search inside, looking 
for weapons, other dangerous items and valuables. 
He said he was “totally responsible” for the car and 
searched it to protect himself, the accused and the 
tow truck operator. He said he was concerned about 
weapons that the accused might use to harm the tow 
truck operator and wanted to protect the operator 
against any allegations of stolen valuables.
The accused claimed his s. 8 Charter rights had been 
breached by the initial inventory search before it was 
to be  towed to a hotel. In his view, the officer had no 
authority to conduct such a search. The judge, 
however, disagreed and found that the inventory 
search was reasonable. She stated:
[The officer] had to remove the vehicle from 
Highway 401, the accused could not drive it and 
there was no one else to drive the vehicle. It was 
therefore the responsibility of [the officer]. It was 
reasonable to assess any pre-existing damage to 
the vehicle, to verify any valuables in the vehicle 
and whether there were any weapons or other 
dangerous items in the vehicle. [The officer] was 
going to release the accused and the vehicle to a 
hotel and therefore, had to verify that there was 
nothing  dangerous in the vehicle and, prior to 
the tow to the hotel, the state of the vehicle and 
valuables.
Further, even if there was a s, 8  violation, the 
evidence was admissible under s.  24(2). The judge 
found the officer acted in good faith, any breach was 
technical as there  is a lower expectation of privacy 
in his vehicle on a  public roadway, and the 
marijuana was real evidence. The accused was 
convicted of possessing  marihuana for the purpose 
of trafficking  and he was sentenced to a year in jail 
plus 12 months of probation.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused argued that the 
trial judge erred in finding  the 
inventory search reasonable. 
He suggested that the  police 
officer had neither the statutory or the common law 
authority to conduct an inventory search of his 
vehicle. Moreover, if the search was unreasonable, 
the accused asserted that the trial judge erred in 
BY THE BOOK:
Driving	 prohibited	 while	 licence	 suspended
Ontario’s Highway Traffic Act
Driving prohibited while licence suspended
s. 36 A person whose driver’s licence or 
privilege to drive a motor vehicle in Ontario 
has been suspended shall not drive a motor 
vehicle or street car in Ontario under a driver’s 
licence or permit issued by any other jurisdiction during the 
suspension.
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admitting  the evidence under s. 24(2). In the 
accused’s view it should have been excluded.
Inventory Search
In this case, the search of the car was warrantless 
and therefore presumptively unreasonable. “To 
justify a warrantless search, the Crown must 
establish, on the  balance of probabilities, that (i)  the 
search was authorized by law; (ii) the law is 
reasonable; and (iii) the search was carried out in a 
reasonable manner,” said Justice Lauwers, writing 
the Court of Appeal’s decision. Although the 
accused’s initial detention to investigate a possible 
contravention of the HTA was lawful, the inventory 
search that followed was not authorized by law:
[T]he power to detain an individual under the 
HTA does not inevitably include the power to 
detain or impound a vehicle, nor does it include 
the power to conduct an inventory search in 
every situation. The officer must be able to point 
to a specific duty or authority to justify his 
search of the [accused’s] vehicle.
The inventory search cannot be justified on the 
basis of officer safety or any suspicion that the 
[accused] was involved in criminal conduct. The 
officer testified that after arresting  the [accused] 
for the first time for driving while his licence was 
suspended, he did not impound or seize the 
[accused’s] car, because he was only conducting 
a t raf f ic invest igat ion, not a cr iminal 
investigation. He agreed the [accused] was 
polite, cooperative and non-confrontational 
throughout. The officer testified that there was, 
“nothing to hint of criminality, zero. He ... had 
no prior criminal record. He was not listed on 
any of the police records as being involved in 
any type of criminal activity, he was just simply 
a suspended driver.” The officer agreed that he 
had no reason to believe that the vehicle 
contained any weapons or other dangerous 
items. [paras. 20-21]
No statutory provision that authorized police to 
impound the vehicle or to search the car was 
identified, nor did the common law provide 
authority to impound it. “[T]he officer did not 
impound the vehicle or exercise the degree of 
control of the vehicle that would have made an 
inventory search necessary,” said Justice Lauwers. 
“The police decision to call a tow truck to remove a 
vehicle does not justify an inventory search in every 
case.” Nor was there  anything  in the circumstances 
that triggered the need for an inventory search. The 
officer had no public safety concerns; he was going 
to release the car to the accused:
In this instance it was quite reasonable for the 
officer to look at the exterior of the car and to 
note any damage before asking  the tow operator 
to take it to the hotel. The officer had taken at 
least that degree of control over the car.
But the other reasons given by the officer for the 
inventory search do not hold up to scrutiny and 
pass constitutional muster. The owner was not 
going to be separated from the car, but was to 
ride with the tow operator to the hotel. There 
was accordingly no reason for the tow operator 
to access the interior of the car and the police 
officer had no cause to be concerned for the 
operator’s safety. [paras. 26-27]
The officer’s duty obliged him to remove the car 
from the highway for safety reasons, but the 
exigencies of the situation did not provide a 
reasonable basis for an inventory  search. Thus, the 
search was unreasonable and the accused’s s. 8 
rights had been infringed.
“[T]he power to detain an individual 
under the HTA does not inevitably 
include the power to detain or impound 
a vehicle, nor does it include the power 
to conduct an inventory search in every 
situation. The officer must be able to 
point to a specific duty or authority to 
justify his search ...”
“The police decision to call a tow truck 
to remove a vehicle does not justify an 
inventory search in every case.”
Volume 16 Issue 2 - March/April 2016
PAGE 11
s. 24(2) Charter
In considering  the s. 24(2)  lines of inquiry (the 
seriousness of the Charter-infringing  state conduct, 
the impact on the Charter-protected interests of the 
accused and society’s interest in adjudication on the 
merits), the Court of Appeal excluded the marihuana 
as evidence. The police misconduct was serious and 
favoured exclusion. “[The officer’s]  invariable 
practice of searching  every car fits the description of 
an impermissible ‘fishing  expedition conducted at a 
random highway stop’,” said Justice Lauwers:
As an instructor of other police officers, he ought 
to be fully conversant with his legal authority, 
but the evidence shows either that he was not or 
that he was prepared to search regardless. His 
attitude was exemplified by his testimony: he 
resisted the notion that what he did was a 
“search”: “I do an inventory sir, not a search”. 
This was plainly a search. [para. 44]
The s. 8 breach was not technical, as described by 
the trial judge. The officer had no authority or 
justification to conduct any type of search inside the 
vehicle despite there being  a lower expectation of 
privacy in it while on a public roadway. The impact 
of an unjustified search is magnified where there is a 
total absence of justification for it.
The accused’s appeal was allowed, the evidence was 
excluded and an acquittal was entered. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
PASSENGER	 IN	 STOPPED	 
VEHICLE	 NOT	 NECESSARILY	 
DETAINED
R. v. Mooiman & Zahar, 2016 SKCA 43
A police officer 
w i t h a d r u g 
sniffing  dog  was 
on traffic patrol. 
He saw a truck 
approaching  at a high rate  of 
speed along  a highway with a 
speed limit of 100 km/h. The 
truck’s front end quickly dipped 
indicating  sudden braking. Radar showed a speed of 
98  km/h suggesting  the vehicle was exceeding  the 
speed limit before it braked and dipped. The officer 
pulled the vehicle over under s.  209.1 of 
Saskatchewan's Traffic  Safety Act to check vehicle 
fitness, the driver’s licence and sobriety, and the 
vehicle’s registration.
As the officer approached the truck, he observed the 
accused  Zahar in the driver’s seat and the accused 
Mooiman in the  front passenger seat. He noticed 
Mooiman had a freshly lit cigarette in his mouth and 
learned the two men were travelling  from Saskatoon, 
Saskatchewan, to Richmond, British Columbia. The 
officer also observed that the men appeared very 
nervous—giggling  and moving  around—and that fast 
food wrappers were on the floor boards of the truck. 
These  observations were striking  to the officer. First, 
in his experience, people  generally discard their 
cigarettes when they are stopped by the police—
they do not light fresh ones—and he had been 
taught that cigarette smoke can be used to mask the 
odour of alcohol or narcotics in a vehicle. Second, 
while both occupants were very  nervous, the 
passenger Mooiman had no reason to be nervous—
he did not face any jeopardy. Additionally, fast-food 
wrappers were a common marker in the  transport of 
narcotics by motor vehicle.
The officer queried both men through the Canadian 
Police Information Centre (CPIC) database and 
Police Information Portal (PIP) database. CPIC 
showed only that Mooiman had a criminal record 
but PIP  had entries associating  both  Mooiman and 
Zahar with criminal drug  activity. The officer then 
detained both men to investigate them for drug 
possession. Zahar was placed in the police vehicle 
while Mooiman was questioned in the truck. When 
Mooiman was informed by the  officer that a sniffer 
dog  would be deployed and asked whether the dog 
would indicate, Mooiman produced a plastic bag 
containing  marihuana. When the officer asked, 
Mooiman said that Zahar knew of this marihuana. 
Both men were arrested for possessing  a controlled 
substance. When the truck was searched, a duffle 
bag  containing  1.9 lbs of packaged marihuana was 
located under a doghouse in the truck’s box. Both 
men were then re-arrested for possessing  marihuana 
for the purposes of trafficking. 
REGULATORY SIGNSCHAPTER 2
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Saskatchewan Provincial Court
The judge found the  PIP entries had 
tipped the balance from mere suspicion 
to reasonable suspicion and that is when 
the detention for investigatory purposes 
commenced. These entries indicated that  Mooiman 
had some kind of previous involvement in the 
production of marihuana and in the trafficking  of its 
resin, and Zahar had been chargeable for possession 
of marihuana and might have had some kind of 
involvement with its production. While not carrying 
“the weight of actual convictions”, the judge found 
they were “significant nonetheless in that they 
demonstrate  potential criminal involvement in 
higher end illicit drug  activities.” The judge also 
accepted that the officer was well experienced and 
trained in the area of drug  transport investigations. 
The judge used the officer’s training  and experience 
in assessing  the value of the information and 
observations that the  officer had articulated in his 
testimony. 
Mooiman’s arrest for possessing  the bag  of 
marihuana he voluntarily  handed over was lawfully 
made under s. 495(1)(b)  of the Criminal Code. Since 
Zahar knew about it and exercised control over it by 
being  the owner and operator of the truck, he was in 
constructive possession of it.  The search of the truck 
was incident to the arrests of either Mooiman or 
Zahar and had not been conducted in an 
unreasonable manner. The evidence was admissible 
and each man was convicted of possessing 
marihuana (not exceeding  three kilograms) for the 
purpose of trafficking. They were sentenced to a 20-
month conditional sentence order. 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
Both accused appealed their 
convictions arguing, in part, 
that the trial judge erred in 
assessing  the legality of their 
detentions and arrests under s. 9 of the Charter. 
Further, they submitted that the  search of the truck 
and seizure of the marihuana violated their rights 
under s. 8. In their view, the evidence should have 
been excluded under s. 24(2). 
Passenger’s Detention & Arrest
Mooiman suggested that, as a passenger in a vehicle 
stopped for traffic safety  reasons, he  had been 
arbitrarily detained because the officer had used this 
opportunity to ask him about his identification and 
then check him on the  CPIC and PIP databases. 
Justice Caldwell, however, rejected this assertion. 
“Only the driver of a vehicle is necessarily detained 
by a traffic-safety stop,” he said. “In the absence of 
some other suggestion of significant physical or 
psychological restraint, a passenger of a vehicle that 
is subject to a traffic-safety  stop  is simply a bystander 
and is not detained for the purposes of s.  9 of the 
Charter. ... Furthermore, it is also clear ... that the 
police may engage in the preliminary questioning  of 
bystanders without giving  rise to a detention under 
ss. 9 and 10 of the Charter.” He continued:
True, the effect of stopping a vehicle and 
detaining the driver may impair the passenger’s 
ability to proceed further, but—all other things 
“In the absence of some other 
suggestion of significant physical or 
psychological restraint, a passenger of 
a vehicle that is subject to a traffic-
safety stop is simply a bystander and is 
not detained for the purposes of s. 9 
of the Charter.”
BY THE BOOK:
Authority	 to	 Stop
Saskatchewan’s Traffic Safety Act
209.1(1) A peace officer may require the person 
in charge of or operating a motor vehicle to 
stop that vehicle if the peace officer:
(a)  is readily identifiable as a peace officer; 
and
            (b) is in the lawful execution of his or her duties and 
responsibilities.
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being neutral—nothing about a routine traffic-
safety stop prevents a passenger of the vehicle 
from simply walking  away. Similarly, absent a 
legal requirement under The Traffic Safety Act, 
the fact a passenger in a vehicle is necessarily 
caught up by a traffic-safety stop does not 
thereby legally compel or obligate the passenger 
to comply with the investigating  police officer’s 
requests for information or assistance. This has 
long been the case at common law. ...
Axiomatically then, if a bystander later seeks to 
allege that he or she had been arbitrarily 
detained—and thereby compelled to answer 
questions or to assist a police officer—the 
bystander must show that he or she had been 
effectively deprived of his or her liberty to 
choose whether or not to engage in conversation 
with or to cooperate with the officer. This is an 
objective test whereby the bystander must 
support his or her contention—i.e., that the 
conduct of the police had effected a significant 
deprivation of liberty—by reference to the 
evidence before the court. [references omitted, 
paras. 22-23]
In this case, Mooiman had not been detained prior 
to the investigatory detention. The initial encounter 
involved preliminary questioning  falling  short of 
detention. It wasn’t until Mooiman  had voluntarily 
identified himself and the officer obtained the CPIC 
and PIP information  linking  Mooiman to criminal 
drug  activity that the officer then proceeded to 
detain him for investigatory purposes. 
Use of CPIC and PIP
The Court of Appeal noted that the PIP  entries were 
not records of convictions, but indicated to the 
officer that both men had previous involvement with 
drug  activity. Nevertheless, the trial judge was 
“entitled to make use of the CPIC and PIP entries in 
his assessment of the circumstances and that, in that 
assessment, the CPIC and PIP entries ‘demonstrate 
potential criminal involvement in higher end illicit 
drug  activities’. The CPIC and PIP  entries were 
relevant to and formed part of the foundation of the 
constable’s subjective suspicion, but, more 
importantly, they may be assessed objectively  in that 
the entries may be adduced into evidence and 
assessed by the court. Moreover, the constable’s 
inquiries of these  databases did not amount to a 
search for the purposes of s. 8 of the Charter—as the 
[accused] freshly allege on appeal—there being  no 
reasonable  expectation of privacy in police 
databases.”
Driver’s Detention & Arrest
The driver too had been lawfully detained and 
arrested. Initially, he had been lawfully detained 
pursuant to the traffic-safety stop. This traffic 
detention then transformed into an investigatory 
detention and then an arrest once Mooiman 
confirmed that  Zahar knew about the bag  of 
marihuana. This provided the officer with reasonable 
grounds to arrest Zahar under s. 495(1)(b)  as being 
in constructive possession of marihuana. 
“[T]he effect of stopping a vehicle and detaining the driver may impair the passenger’s 
ability to proceed further, but—all other things being neutral—nothing about a routine 
traffic-safety stop prevents a passenger of the vehicle from simply walking away.”
SUBJECT: MOOIMAN
REG OWNER ZZZ PRODUCTION - 
CANNABIS
CHARGED TRAFFICK - CANNABIS RESNN
300G#U
SUBJECT: ZAHAR
General Information
ZAHAR
SHANE BELA
MALE, Born on [redacted]
SUSP CHGBLE POSSESSION - CANNABIS
30G#UNDER
OTHER  ZZZPRODUCTION CANNABIS
What the PIP entries said:
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The Truck Search
Justice Caldwell concluded that Mooiman, as a mere 
passenger in the truck, did not have a  reasonable 
expectation of privacy in it and therefore his 
personal rights under s.  8  of the Charter were not 
engaged by its search. Mooiman did not own the 
truck, was not found operating  it and there was no 
evidence he had made personal use of it, had 
exercised any control over it or had regulated access 
to it. Since  Mooiman’s s. 8 rights were not engaged 
by the search of the truck, his s. 8 rights could not be 
violated by its search.
As for Zahar, he had a reasonable  expectation of 
privacy in the truck as its owner and operator and, 
therefore, his s.  8 rights were engaged. The search 
however, was authorized as an incident to the arrest 
of either him or Mooiman:
In this case, the search of Mr. Zahar’s truck was 
rationally connected to the offence for which 
[the officer] had arrested both Mr. Mooiman and 
Mr. Zahar. Its purpose was to locate or preserve 
evidence relating  to their possession of a 
controlled substance. Although additional 
reasonable and probable grounds were not 
required in the circumstances, it could be said 
that the search was founded upon a belief based 
on reasonable grounds that an offence under s. 5
(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act 
had been or was being committed. Nevertheless, 
on the facts of this matter, the search in question 
was undoubtedly “truly incidental” to the arrest 
of either Mr. Mooiman or Mr. Zahar or both of 
them. And, it was, for these reasons, a lawful 
search that did not violate Mr.  Zahar’s rights 
under s. 8 of the Charter. [para. 42]
Since there were no ss.  8 or 9 breaches, a remedy 
under s.  24(2)  of was unavailable. The accuseds’ 
appeals were dismissed and their convictions were 
upheld. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
ENTRAPMENT	 APPLICATION	 
REJECTED:	 POLICE	 ACTED	 ON	 
REASONABLE	 SUSPICION
R. v. Ayangma, 2016 PECA 6                   
The police launched operation “Clean 
Sweep” to disrupt the illicit drug  trade 
in Charlottetown.  They utilized the 
services of an agent under the control 
of the police who made buys from 
various mid to upper range drug  trafficking  targets, 
the accused being  one of them. There were nine 
confidential informants and one casual confidential 
informant. They provided information that the 
accused was heavily involved in the drug  trade and 
was involving  several other people to traffic for him. 
The nine confidential informants had provided 
information before  which resulted in positive search 
warrants and arrests, and the police believed them to 
be reliable.  As well, the accused had a record for 
drug trafficking. 
The agent used Facebook and text messages to 
communicate  with prospective sellers, including  a 
conversation with “Sabinairo Pepper” (the accused). 
A Facebook conversation began after the agent sent 
a “friend request” too the accused:
Accused: “what’s up”.
Agent:  “Hard  at it.... listin  can  u  help  me I need 
play ball soft ball or hard ball don’t madder”.  
The Accused: “Have we met”. 
Sign up for the email list
www.10-8.ca
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The conversation continued with the agent offering 
suggestions of how the accused knew him, but the 
accused rejected each suggestion.
Agent: “ ... you may know me threw keegan to”
Accused:   “No clue buddy keighan  says he knows ya 
but I don’t”.
Agent:  “ Can u  or him point me in a way to play 
ball”. 
Accused:  “Waiting  for my buddy to come down 
from sside if you wanna wait till  after supper he will 
prob meet you”.  
Agent: “Ill want a half o if he will”.
Accused: “Don’t think he has that much”.
The agent then exchanged numerous text messages 
with “Keegan” (later identified as John Scott) 
arranging  for a  pick up. Surveillance officers 
watched Scott get into the agent’s vehicle, then 
followed it to another location where the agent gave 
Scott $600 for drugs. Scott exited the agent’s car and 
walked away to meet the accused. Scott then 
returned to the car and gave the agent cocaine. 
Three more scenarios followed over the next 10 
days. During  these scenarios, the accused sold 
cocaine to the agent. The accused was charged with 
one count of joint trafficking  with Scott and three 
additional counts of trafficking. 
Prince Edward Island Supreme Court
The judge convicted the accused on all 
four counts of trafficking. The accused 
then argued that he was entrapped and 
deserved a stay of proceedings on the 
charges. In his view, the agent provided an 
opportunity to commit a crime when the agent said, 
“Hard at it.... listin  can  u  help  me I need  play ball 
soft ball  or hard ball  don’t madder”.  The judge, 
however, disagreed. He found the statement “listin 
can  u  help  me I need play ball  soft ball or hard  ball 
don’t madder” was investigative language that did 
not constitute the presentation of an opportunity to 
commit a crime. “The question was essentially 
whether [the accused] was willing  to sell drugs to 
the agent or not,” said the judge. “I find the 
presentation of the opportunity  did not occur until 
the agent stated, “Ill want a half o if he will”. 
The judge went on to conclude that when the 
presentation to commit a crime was made, the 
police had the necessary reasonable suspicion to do 
so. “The nature of the information provided by the 
informants was compelling, credible, and 
corroborated,” said the judge. “The information 
named suppliers, the places in which they operated, 
individuals [the accused] sold to and used to sell 
drugs for him, the kind of drugs sold, places at 
which drugs were sold, cell phone numbers of 
individuals involved, the frequency with which [the 
accused] was involved, and various other pieces of 
information.” The entrapment defence was rejected 
and the convictions upheld. The  accused was 
sentenced to 30 months incarceration.
 
Prince Edward Island Court of Appeal
The accused appealed his 
convictions asserting, among 
other things, that the trial judge 
e r r e d i n r e j e c t i n g  h i s 
entrapment claim. In his opinion, the police did not 
have a reasonable suspicion that he was involved in 
trafficking  drugs before providing  him the 
opportunity to commit the offence and therefore 
they engaged in random virtue testing. 
Entrapment
Justice Mitchell, speaking  for the Court of Appeal, 
described the underlying  reasons for the doctrine of 
entrapment this way:
It is the belief that the administration of justice 
must be kept free from disrepute that compels 
recognition of the doctrine of entrapment. There 
mus t no t be jud ic ia l condonat ion o f 
unacceptable conduct by investigatory and 
prosecutorial agencies. The state can only go so 
far in investigating crime. Entrapment is a very 
serious allegation against the state as it means 
that state conduct violates our notion of fair play 
and decency and shows a blatant disregard for 
the qualities of humanness which all of us 
share.  The onus is on the accused to show on a 
balance of probabilities that the conduct of the 
state merits a stay of proceedings. A stay will be 
granted only in the clearest of cases. [references 
omitted, para. 33]
...
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Citing  the Supreme Court of Canada judgment of R. 
v. Mack, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 903, entrapment occurs 
when:
(a) the authorities provide a person with an 
opportunity to commit an offence without acting 
on a reasonable suspicion that this person is 
already engaged in criminal activity or pursuant 
to a bona fide inquiry;
(b) although having such a reasonable suspicion or 
acting in the course of a bona fide inquiry they 
go beyond providing  an opportunity and induce 
the commission of an offence.
Thus, if the police have a reasonable suspicion that a 
person is engaged in a criminal activity they can 
provide that person with an opportunity to commit 
the offence.
Was There Reasonable Suspicion?
There is a difference between suspicion, reasonable 
suspicion, and reasonable and probable grounds.  
Justice Mitchell stated:
Reasonable and probable grounds relate to the 
probability of criminal activity; reasonable 
suspicion relates to the possibility of criminal 
activity. Reasonable suspicion is an intermediate 
standard between suspicion and reasonable and 
probable grounds.  Reasonable and probable 
grounds will suffice to obtain a search warrant 
while a reasonable suspicion will not.  It is 
simply a matter of degree. To determine 
reasonable suspicion the court must consider the 
constellation of objectively discernable 
facts. [para. 37]
In this case, the Court of Appeal agreed with the trial 
judge that the reasonable suspicion standard had 
been met. There was evidence providing  a 
reasonable suspicion of the accused’s participation 
in drug  trafficking. Furthermore, even though the 
trial judge was correct in concluding  the opening 
comment by the agent was investigatory, rather than 
an opportunity  to commit a crime, this really did not 
matter. This was not a random virtue  testing  case.  
The police had reasonable suspicion to believe that 
the accused was involved in the drug  trade even 
before the agent initiated contact with him. 
The accused’s appeal on the entrapment issue was 
dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Editor’s note:  Additional facts taken from R. v. 
Ayangma, 2015 PESC 19.
“Reasonable and probable grounds relate to the probability of criminal activity; 
reasonable suspicion relates to the possibility of criminal activity. Reasonable suspicion is 
an intermediate standard between suspicion and reasonable and probable 
grounds. Reasonable and probable grounds will suffice to obtain a search warrant while a 
reasonable suspicion will not. It is simply a matter of degree. To determine reasonable 
suspicion the court must consider the constellation of objectively discernable facts.”
Suspicion
Reasonable
Suspicion
Reasonable
Belief
Subjective only Subjective + facts =
Possibility of crime
Subjective + more facts =
Probability of crime
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ASKING	 IF	 SOMEONE	 CAN	 
HOOK	 A	 PERSON	 UP	 WITH	 
DRUGS	 IS	 NOT,	 BY	 ITSELF,	 
ENTRAPMENT
R. v. Le, 2016 BCCA 155
The police received a phone number 
of a  suspected dial-a-dope drug 
trafficker from a Crime Stoppers tip. 
The tip  reported that a male person 
with a strong  Asain accent monitored 
a specific cell phone number and sold drugs in 
Surrey, BC. Six months later an officer called the 
number as part of an undercover operation targeting 
dial-a-dope operations. The man who answered the 
phone had a thick Asian accent. The  the officer 
asked “Can you hook me up?” When the man 
responded positively, the officer then asked if the 
man could provide him with an eight ball of 
cocaine. When the man said he could, the officer 
then asked how much it would cost and was told 
$200. The two agreed to meet in Surrey. The man 
said he would be driving a white Honda Prelude. 
When they met, the officer approached the driver 
side of the Prelude and had a conversation with the 
lone occupant in the driver’s seat, an Asian male. He 
asked the man if he had “the stuff”. The man showed 
the officer a package of cigarettes. When the officer 
asked to see the drugs, the man opened the package 
and showed him a single  rock of crack cocaine. The 
officer looked into the package and saw the 
remainder of the drugs. The man was given $200 
and the officer received the cigarette package. As the 
Prelude left, the vehicle was stopped within minutes 
of leaving  the scene of the drug  purchase and its 
driver, the accused, was arrested. The accused was 
searched and police found $40 cash and a cell 
phone on him. As well, the $200 the officer used to 
buy the drugs (confirmed by serial numbers)  was 
seized from the front passenger seat of the Prelude . 
British Columbia Supreme Court
The accused was convicted of trafficking 
in cocaine. However, he brought a 
motion for a stay of proceedings on the 
basis of entrapment. He submitted that 
the police essentially made a  cold call and did not 
have a  reasonable suspicion prior to offering  an 
opportunity to commit the offence. The  judge, 
however, held that the question, “Can you hook me 
up?” was not providing  an opportunity to commit an 
offence. He concluded that the police, acting  on a 
Crime Stoppers tip  and receiving  a positive response 
to “Can you hook me up?”, had reasonable 
suspicion. Therefore, the accused had not 
demonstrated that he was entrapped:
In this case, [the officer] clearly engaged in the 
preliminaries of a drug  transaction while 
arranging to meet and then meeting  the accused. 
Whatever level of suspicion the police had in 
this particular investigation before the phone call 
being made was raised to reasonable suspicion 
by the positive response of this accused. Indeed, 
his response raised the suspicion to a level of 
reasonable suspicion and it allowed [the officer]
to request the sale of an eight ball of cocaine, 
the price of which was set by the accused. The 
sale of drugs at an agreed meeting followed. 
[2014 BCSC 2207, para. 27]
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused suggested, among 
other things, that the trial judge 
erred in finding  that he was not 
entrapped. The  accused argued 
that the trial misapprehended the evidence because 
the officer asked “Can you hook me up with an eight 
ball?”, and not merely “Can you hook me up?” In his 
view, this made a difference in his entrapment claim.
Entrapment
Justice Bennett, writing  the Court of Appeal’s 
judgment, reviewed the law of entrapment and 
noted the following:
• Entrapment is a  defence that must be 
established by an accused on a  balance of 
probabilities, only after conviction.
• Entrapment occurs when
‣ the authorities provide a person with an 
opportunity to commit an offence without 
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acting  on a reasonable suspicion that this 
person is already engaged in criminal activity 
or pursuant to a bona fide inquiry.
‣ although having  such a reasonable suspicion 
or acting  in the course of a bona fide  inquiry, 
they go beyond providing  an opportunity 
and induce the commission of  an offence.
• The requirement for either a reasonable 
suspicion that the person is engaged in illegal 
activity or a bona fide inquiry is to avoid the risk 
that the police will attract people who would 
not otherwise commit a crime.
• It is not a  proper use of police  power to “test the 
virtue of people on a random basis”.
• When there is a bona fide investigation, the 
police may offer individuals they encounter in 
t he  cou r se o f t ha t i nve s t i ga t ion the 
“opportunity” to commit a crime, even if they 
do not have reasonable suspicion that individual 
was engaged in criminal activity. 
In this case, Justice Bennett found that it made no 
difference whether the  officer added “with an eight 
ball” or “an eight ball of cocaine” after his initial 
request to be “hooked up”. She stated:
First, the police had reasonable suspicion when 
the call was answered: (i)  they had a Crime 
Stoppers tip containing  details about the phone 
number used, the suspected dealer’s gender, 
ethnicity and territory of operation, (ii) aspects of 
the tip were confirmed when the telephone was 
answered by an Asian-sounding male, and 
(iii)  there was evidence of “Swan checks” that 
the defence did not pursue.
Second, even if there was not reasonable 
suspicion, this minimal conversation can only 
amount to part of the investigation of the tip to 
see if the target responded. It was not an 
opportunity to commit a crime. [The accused’s] 
own expression of willingness to transact during 
the phone call raised a reasonable suspicion. 
Afterwards, a deal was struck in person. In my 
view, asking  someone if he can “hook a person 
up with drugs” is not, in and of itself, 
entrapment.
Defence counsel argued that there is a 
meaningful dis t inct ion between vei led 
statements asking  if the other party is a drug 
dealer and more specific requests for types, 
quantities, or values of drugs. It was argued that 
the former statement is an investigatory step 
while the latter is an offer to commit an offence. 
Parsing the language of undercover drugs calls in 
dial-a-dope investigations in this way takes an 
unnecessarily narrow approach. It ignores the 
su r rounding  c i rcums tances , bu t more 
importantly, it strays far from the core principle 
underlying Mack.
...
Objectively speaking, innocent and otherwise 
law-abiding individuals would not be 
“manipulated” or tempted to enter the 
dangerous and illicit drug trade if asked by a 
stranger over the phone to sell him drugs. It 
defies common sense to suggest that asking 
whether an individual is willing to sell specific 
types, quantities, or values of illicit drugs runs 
the “serious unnecessary risk” that an otherwise 
innocent person would then go out, procure the 
drugs, meet with and sell them to a stranger.
Third, [the officer’s] phone call did not amount 
to entrapment given the analysis and 
conclusions in Swan. The call was not part of 
hundreds of random calls, like Swan, but fell 
within a bona fide investigation or inquiry, 
having  regard to the difficulty of investigating 
dial-a-dope offences and not confining dial-a-
dope to a known location because of the mobile 
nature of the crime. {paras. 91-96]
The police conduct did not amount to entrapment 
and the accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
“In my view, asking someone if he can “hook a person up with drugs” is not, in and of 
itself, entrapment.”
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RCMP ‘HQ’ & 
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1,130
CANADA: By the Numbers
Royal Newfoundland Constabulary
 393
Quebec Provincial Police
 5,555
Ontario Provincial Police
 6,137
Canada’s Police Officers by City - Top 10
CMA Officers % Change
Number per 100,000 2014>2015
Toronto, ON 5,425 193 +0.4%
Montreal, QC 4,638 233 -0.9%
Calgary,  AB 2,147 170 -0.7%
Peel Region,  ON 1,951 144 -0.3%
Edmonton,  AB 1,665 179 -2.5%
York Region, ON 1,535 137 +0.1%
Winnipeg, MB 1,422 200 -5.0%
Vancouver, BC 1,280 197 -2.9%
Ottawa, ON 1,272 134 -3.4%
Durham Region, ON 866 133 -1.0%
POLICING	 ACROSS	 CANADA:	 
FACTS	 &	 FIGURES
According  to a  recent report 
released by Statistics Canada, 
there  were 68,777 active police 
officers across Canada in 2015. 
This represented a  decrease of 
29 officers from the previous 
year. Ontario had the most police officers at 26,205, 
while the Yukon had the  least at 130. With a national 
population of 35,851,774, Canada’s average cop per 
pop ratio was 192 police officers per 100,000 residents. 
Total population: 35,851,774
Source: Statistics Canada, Police Resources in Canada, 
2015, Catalogue no:  85-225-X, March 2016
2015
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2014	 FAST	 FACTS
• On the snapshot day of May 15, 2015 there 
were 68,777 police officers in Canada. There 
were an additional 28,368 civilians, which 
represented 29% of all police  personnel. There 
were 2.4 officers for every civilian employed.  
• Saskatchewan had the highest provincial rate of 
police strength at 202 officers per 100,000 
residents (cop to pop  ratio)  followed closely by 
Manitoba at 201 officers per 100,000. The 
Northwest Territories had the  highest territorial 
cop to pop ratio at 456 officers per 100,000.
• 54.5% of police officers were 40 years of age or 
older. 
• 17.9% of officers were over the age of 50.
• For municipal police services serving  a 
population of 100,000 or more, Victoria B.C. 
had the highest police strength at 240 officers 
per 100,000, followed by Montreal, QC (233) 
and Halifax, NS (218).  Richmond, BC had the 
lowest police strength at 97 officers per 
100,000. 
• For 2014/2015, 80% of officers hired were 
recruits. The remainder were experienced police 
officers.
• In May 2015 there  were  14,332 female police 
officers in Canada. This represents 20.8% of all 
officers and is a +1.3% increase over 2014.
• Women represented 67.8% of civilians 
employed by police services. 
• Police expenditures continue to rise, more than 
doubling since 2000.
• Per capita costs for policing  in fiscal 2014/2015 
translated to $391 per Canadian.
• Provincial police services in Ontario, Quebec 
and Newfoundland cost $2.1 billion.
• Stand alone municipal services cost $7.3 billion.
• The total operating  costs for the RCMP 
amounted to $4.5 billion.
RETIREMENT
At the end of the 2014/2015, 11% of police 
officers were eligible to retire. Newfoundland had 
the highest proportion of officers that could retire 
at 23%. 48% of officers at RCMP Headquarters 
and the Training Academy could retire.
Top 10 Retirement Eligible      
Municipal Police Services 
Municipal Police Service Eligible to Retire %
St. John’s, NL 33.4%
Winnipeg, MB 23.9%
Codiac Region (Moncton) NB 22.8%
Victoria, BC 21.0%
Hamilton, ON 20.6%
Montreal, QC 17.9%
Coquitlam, BC 14.6%
Kelowna, BC 11.2%
Langley Township, BC 10.1%
BC	 Law	 Enforcement	 
Memorial
Sunday,	 September	 25,	 2016	 
at	 1:00	 pm 
Brockton	 Oval,	 Stanley	 Park	 
Vancouver,	 British	 Columbia
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RCMP
The RCMP is Canada’s largest police 
organization. It is divided into 15 Divisions 
with Headquarters in Ottawa. Each 
division is managed by a commanding 
officer and is designated alphabetically. 
RCMP On-Strength Establishment         
as of September 1, 2015
Rank #	 of	 positions
Commissioner 1
Deputy Commissioners 7
Assistant Commissioners 26
Chief Superintendents 58
Superintendents 179
Inspectors 348
Corps Sergeant Major 1
Sergeants Major 1
Staff Sergeants Major 13
Staff Sergeants 812
Sergeants 1,923
Corporals 3,377
Constables 11,491
Special Constables 55
Civilian Members 3,838
Public Servants 6,331
Total 28,461
Source: www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/about-ausujet/organi-eng.htm
RCMP Officers by Level of Policing - Canada 2015 (numbers do not include 1,130 members at HQ & Training Academy)
Level / Region BC AB SK MN ON QC NB NS PEI NL YK NWT NU Total
Contract 5,265 2,596 988 815 - - 688 810 102 401 112 181 116 12,074
Federal & 
other policing
879 350 257 198 1,654 935 153 182 27 95 18 20 15 4,783
Total 6,144 2,946 1,245 1,013 1,654 935 841 992 129 496 130 201 131 16,857
RCMP DIVISIONS
Division Area
Depot Regina, SK (Training Academy)
National National Capital Region
B Newfoundland & Labrador
C Quebec
D Manitoba
E British Columbia
F Saskatchewan
G Northwest Territories
H Nova Scotia
J New Brunswick
K Alberta
L Prince Edward Island
M Yukon Territory
O Ontario
V Nunavut Territory
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